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In the immediate post-Cold War years, the United States virtually renounced all 
interest in Sub-Saharan Africa. With the end of the cold war superpower 
confrontation, Africa – as a site of ideological and political competition between 
capitalism and communism – largely receded from the official United States’ 
worldview. After a disastrous experiment in “assertive multilateralism” in Somalia 
1993, the Clinton administration distanced itself from an area of the world that was 
simply not important to the United States in a geopolitical or commercial sense. The 
1995 Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa stated plainly that “America’s security 
interests in Africa are very limited.  At present we have no permanent or significant 
military presence anywhere in Africa: We have no bases; we station no combat 
forces; and we homeport no ships… [U]ltimately we see very little traditional 
strategic interest in Africa.” 1 
 
This was a remarkable turnaround from the Cold War years when the process of 
decolonisation, and the competition for the future allegiance of these countries, led to 
the extension of the superpower conflict to Sub-Saharan Africa. As Elizabeth Schmidt 
notes, when colonial systems there began to falter in the 1950s, “imperial and Cold 
War powers vied to control the decolonisation process” and “strove to shape a new 
international order that instead catered to their interests.”2 In the Horn of Africa 
(Ethiopia and Somalia), the Congo, and the former Portuguese colonies (Angola and 
                                                        
1 In this report ‘Africa’ is used as shorthand for Sub-Saharan Africa. The same is true of this article: 
‘Africa’ refers to Sub-Saharan Africa. US Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa, Office of International 
Security Affairs, Department of Defense, 1 August 1995, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA297401 (23.10.17)  
2 Elizabeth Schmidt, Foreign Intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror 
(Cambridge University Press, New York 2013): 1-2. See also Jonathan T. Reynolds, Sovereignty and 
Struggle: Africa and Africans in the Era of the Cold War 1945-1994 (Oxford University Press: New 
York and Oxford, 2015): 55. 
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Mozambique), the United States fought proxy wars against the Soviet Union, Cuba, 
and other socialist countries, to contain indigenous pro-independence communist and 
socialist groups. In the process, it also intervened in the struggle against apartheid. 
Since anti-apartheid forces in South Africa, South West Africa (now Namibia) and 
Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) were strongly left-leaning, included many 
communists, and were permitted to operate inside independent Angola and 
Mozambique by the post-colonial leftist governments there, the United States allied 
itself with the white minority government in Pretoria, which shared Washington’s 
opposition to radical nationalism and communism (and, through its alliance with the 
United States, was, for some years, shielded from the worst international criticism of 
its violent racist practices.)3  
 
This intense involvement in African affairs during the Cold War years ended 
ambivalently for the United States. While Washington consolidated the anti-
communist Mobutu regime in the Congo (then Zaire) in the 1960s, this led to a 32-
year reign of terror and kleptocracy, and as Mobutu lost his foreign sponsors – the 
United States and Belgium, the former colonial power – in the early nineties, his 
regime collapsed.4  In 1990, the Ethiopian leader, Haile Mariam Mengistu, formerly 
backed by the Soviet Union, embraced market reforms, changed the name of the 
                                                        
3 See Piero Gleijeses, Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria and the Struggle for 
Southern Africa, 1976-1991 (University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, 2013); Piero Gleijeses, 
Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-76 (University of North Carolina: Chapel 
Hill, 2002); Schmidt, Foreign Intervention in Africa: 57-164; Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War 
(Cambridge University Press: Cambridge and New York, 2007): 131-143, 207-287, 387-395; James M. 
Scott, Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy (Duke University 
Press: Durham and London, 1996): 112-151, 193-212; Reynolds, Sovereignty and Struggle: 50-78; 
Peter Woodward, The Horn of Africa: Politics and International Relations (I.B. Tauris: London and 
New York, 2003): 134-150. 
4 Schmidt, Foreign Intervention in Africa: 208. The U.S. intervened three times during the Cold War to 
help Mobutu crush internal challenges. See Michael Clough, Free at Last? U.S. Policy Toward Africa 
at the End of the Cold War (Council on Foreign Relations Press: New York, 2002): 79-83. 
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communist party, and indicated a willingness to work with the United States. He was 
defeated, however, by armed opposition forces and eventually assisted into exile by 
Washington.5 In Somalia, US Cold War ally Siad Barre, was ousted by a clan 
rebellion against his government, which led to the collapse of all central authority in 
Mogadishu, from which the country has yet to fully recover.6 Across southern Africa, 
white minority – and therefore anti-communist – rule was defeated by the successful 
insurgency of the African National Congress (ANC), Western sanctions (some but not 
all supported by the United States), and the Cuban military intervention in Namibia, 
which effectively defeated South African forces there, catalysing the downfall of the 
apartheid regime in Pretoria.7 Thus the United States faced strategic defeat in 
Ethiopia, Somalia, and southern Africa, though the political cost of supporting 
minority white government in South Africa had become increasingly untenable and 
the moral victory of the ANC could not be denied. 
 
At the end of the Cold War, the United States (and the Soviet Union) withdrew from 
Sub-Saharan Africa. As Jonathan Reynolds observes, “the post-Cold War world, for 
all of its democratic optimism, was also characterised by a painful streak of disregard 
as politics in Africa… became irrelevant to affairs in the industrialised world.”8 The 
small-scale humanitarian intervention in Somalia in 1992 – agreed after President 
George H. W. Bush had already lost the November election – was intended as “a 
valedictory good deed.”9 When the incoming Clinton administration experimented 
with a policy of “assertive multilateralism” – embodied in the expansion of the 
                                                        
5 Westad, Global Cold War: 287, 390. 
6 Ibid: 287; Woodward, Horn of Africa: 97-99. 
7 Gleijeses, Visions of Freedom: 508. 
8 Reynolds, Sovereignty and Struggle: 77. 
9 Michael Mandelbaum, Mission Failure: America and the World in the Post-Cold War Era (Oxford 
University Press: New York, 2016): 87. 
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Somalian intervention into a nation building exercise – Clinton’s support for it was “a 
mile wide but an inch deep.”10 As Leonie Murray and Michael MacKinnon 
demonstrate, the deaths of eighteen US service members in Mogadishu in October 
1993, led the Clinton administration to abandon “assertive multilateralism”. The 
resulting Presidential Decision Directive added so many conditions to US 
participation in peacekeeping operations that the policy was effectively discarded.11 
When it became clear that genocide was occurring in Rwanda in 1994, Secretary of 
State, Warren Christopher, affirmed that the administration should avoid using the 
word ‘genocide’ to describe the events lest the United States be called upon to 
intervene more forcefully.12  
 
This neglect of African affairs, embodied in the 1995 Strategy quoted at the outset, 
continued for the remainder of Clinton’s term in office. Humanitarian considerations 
alone were not sufficient to compel US intervention, and since no truly vital interests 
were identified in Africa, it remained peripheral at best for US policymakers. 
 
In the twenty-first century, however, there has been a significant turnaround in US 
policy – a return, in fact, to viewing Sub-Saharan Africa through a geopolitical lens. 
The period of relative neglect that characterised the years between ‘11/9’ and ‘9/11’ 
                                                        
10 Leonie G. Murray, Clinton, Peacekeeping, and Humanitarian Intervention (Routledge: London and 
New York, 2008): 61. See Presidential Review Directive 13, ‘Multilateral Peacekeeping Operations’, 
15 February 1993, https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36558 (05.07.18) 
11 Presidential Decision Directive 25, ‘US Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations’, 3 May 
1994, https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12749 . Murray, Clinton, Peacekeeping, and 
Humanitarian Intervention; Micheal G. MacKinnon, The Evolution of US Peacekeeping Policy Under 
Clinton (Frank Cass: London and Portland, 2000). See also Robert C. DiPrizio, Armed Humanitarians: 
U.S. Interventions from Northern Iraq to Kosovo (Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, 2002): 
44-60.   
12 Action Memorandum to the Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, 21 May 1994, reproduced in 
Jared Cohen, One Hundred Days of Silence: America and the Rwanda Genocide (Rowman & 
Littlefield Inc.: Lanham, 2007): 140. 
 6 
now appears as an anomalous interregnum between two periods in which Sub-
Saharan Africa was approached in geopolitical terms.13 The region has again become 
integral to America’s global grand strategy. No longer is Africa viewed solely as an 
undifferentiated site of intractable civil wars and humanitarian tragedy, where the 
United States risks squandering its power resources on conflicts in which it has no 
discernible geopolitical or economic interest. In the 21st century – as in the Cold War 
– the US view of Sub-Saharan Africa is much more firmly grounded in perceptions of 
material interests, geopolitical and security considerations. The region is now 
approached in grand strategic terms. While the United States is in relative decline in 
the early twenty-first century, it remains the greatest single aggregation of power in 
the world.14 It defines its national interest in expansive global and transnational terms 
– including, now, in the Sub-Saharan region. 
 
As Hal Brands’ observes, a grand strategy is “a purposeful and coherent set of ideas 
about what a nation seeks to accomplish in the world, and how it should go about 
doing so.”15 As far as possible, it seeks to match means with ends and methods with 
objectives. Great powers often have interests in nearly every region of the world.16 
Those regions are viewed in instrumental terms: what does the United States need, 
                                                        
13 ‘11/9’ is the shorthand name given to the collapse of communism in November 1989 by Derek 
Chollet and James Goldgeier in America Between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11- The Misunderstood 
Years Between the Fall of the Berlin Wall and the Start of the War on Terror (Public Affairs: New 
York, 2009). Prior to the Cold War, European colonial powers also viewed Africa in geopolitical 
terms. See Thomas Packenham, The Scramble for Africa (Abacus: London, 1991); Lawrence James, 
Empires in the Sun: The Struggle for the Mastery of Africa (W.W. Norton & Co.: New York, 2017); 
and M.E. Chamberlain, The Scramble for Africa (Routledge: Oxon and New York, 2013).  
14 Adam Quinn, ‘The art of declining politely: Obama’s prudent presidency and the waning of 
American power’ International Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 4, 2011: 808. Richard Haass ‘U.S. Foreign Policy 
in a Nonpolar World’, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2008: 44-56. 
15 Hal Brands, What Is Good Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry 
S. Truman to George W. Bush (Cornell University Press: Ithaca and London, 2014): 3.  
16 Brands, What Is Good Grand Strategy?: 7. 
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and what does each area offer? The politics of geography – or geopolitics – is central 
to strategy-making.17  
 
This article takes as its starting point the assumption – best expounded by Andrew 
Bacevich, Doug Stokes and Sam Raphael – that in the 21st century, the United States 
pursues an imperial grand strategy devoted to the management and extension of a 
world order conducive to neoliberal capitalism. This entails upholding global 
economic openness, providing global public goods such as energy security, and 
confronting security challenges – including, in the 21st century, transnational security 
challenges – that threaten the stability of the global order.18 In the words of the 2010 
National Security Strategy, the United States seeks “A strong, innovative, and 
growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes 
                                                        
17 Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (Oxford University Press: New York, 2013): 120-22. The 
literature on grand strategy is voluminous.  For an overview of the historical, social scientific, practical, 
and military approaches to US grand strategy, see William C. Martell, Grand Strategy in Theory and in 
Practice: The Need for an Effective American Foreign Policy (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 
and New York, 2015): 7-19. Other important contributions include: Christopher Hemmer, American 
Pendulum: Recurring Debates in U.S. Grand Strategy (Cornell University Press: Ithaca and London, 
2015); Barry R. Posen, Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy (Cornell University 
Press: Ithaca and London, 2015); Robert J. Lieber, Retreat and Its Consequences: American Foreign 
Policy and the Problem of World Order (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge and New York, 
2016); Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, America Abroad: The United States Global Role in the 
21st Century (Oxford University Press, New York, 2016); Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: 
American Grand Strategy from 1940-Present (Cornell University Press: Ithaca and London, 2007); 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives 
(Basic Books: New York 1998). 
18 As Doug Stokes and Sam Raphael argue, the extension of the neoliberal global order to resource-rich 
areas, such as the Gulf of Guinea, is a hallmark of American hegemony. See their, Global Energy 
Security and American Hegemony (Johns Hopkins University Press: Washington, 2010). Similarly 
Andrew J. Bacevich writes of a contemporary American “empire” characterized by an open economic 
system in which the United States acts “as the ultimate guarantor of order and enforcer of norms.” See 
his American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: 2002): 3. Niall Ferguson argues that the United States 
“underwrites the free international exchange of commodities, labor and capital [and] also creates and 
upholds the conditions without which markets cannot function – peace and order, the rule of law…” 
See his Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire (Penguin: New York, 2004): 2. For the 
first scholarly articulation of a global grand strategy that is ultimately economically driven, see 
William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (W.W. Norton & Co.: New York, 
1972). For an updated history of “the open door” and its influence on US global strategy see Michael 
Patrick Cullinane and Alex Goodall, The Open Door Era: United States Foreign Policy in the 
Twentieth Century (Edinburgh University Press: Edinburgh, 2017).    
 8 
opportunity and prosperity” and “an international order advanced by U.S. leadership 
that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet 
global challenges.”19 This strategy, I argue, has both international and transnational 
dimensions: international because it seeks to uphold and extend a world order from 
which other countries may derive benefits (for example through the provision of 
global public goods like energy); and transnational because it seeks to counter 
inherently transnational security challenges such as terrorism and piracy.20 In this 
article, I analyse Washington’s attempt to integrate Sub-Saharan Africa into this order 
in the 21st century. In the Bush and Obama presidencies, US policymakers 
increasingly viewed Sub-Saharan Africa as a site of valuable commercial, 
geopolitical, and security interests, over which the United States must exercise some 
degree of influence if it was to maintain its position as the world’s pre-eminent power 
for as long as possible. More specifically, I argue that its new geopolitical framework 
for Africa has been characterised by three categories of interest and concern: first, 
since 2001, the region’s expanding petroleum resources, especially in the Gulf of 
Guinea, have been viewed as a way of diversifying US oil supplies away from the 
Middle East, and – more recently as the United States’ own energy imports from West 
Africa have drastically declined – of bolstering the United States’ global role as the 
guarantor of energy supplies for others.  Second, parts of the region have also been 
perceived by US policymakers since 9/11 as key loci of transnational Islamist 
terrorism. Thirdly and finally, recent population growth and an emerging middle class 
have made Sub-Saharan Africa an attractive and important potential market for the 
                                                        
19 National Security Strategy, May 2010, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf: 7 
20 On the distinction between internationalism and transnationalism see Akira Iriye, ‘Toward 
Transnationalism’ in Andrew J. Bacevich (ed.) The Short American Century: A Postmortem (Harvard 
University Press: Cambridge, Mass., London, 2012: 121-141. 
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United States. In sum, material and security concerns meant that, from the perspective 
of US strategists, Sub-Saharan Africa could no longer be ignored in the formation of 
global grand strategy. 
 
Elements of this new approach have not gone unnoticed by scholars. Co-authors Doug 
Stokes and Sam Raphael, and (writing separately) Michael Klare have produced 
important accounts of the United States’ global energy policy since the turn of the 21st 
century, incorporating the Gulf of Guinea, and the broader significance of energy for 
US hegemony.21 A separate line of analysis examines terrorism in Africa, especially 
the Horn, in the pre- and post-9/11 period.22 From a US perspective, recent population 
and economic growth in Africa has been largely overlooked, although there are 
numerous accounts of China’s economic investment in Africa.23 Other scholars still 
treat Sub-Saharan Africa as largely peripheral to US grand strategy in the 21st 
century.24  
 
                                                        
21 Stokes and Raphael argue that it is just the energy producing regions of Africa – i.e. the Gulf of 
Guinea states – that Washington seeks to ‘transnationalize’. I argue here that US interest in Africa 
transcends its resource rich areas. Stokes and Raphael, Global Energy Security and American 
Hegemony. Michael Klare Blood and Oil: How America’s Thirst for Petrol is Killing Us (London and 
New York: 2004) and Michael Klare, Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: How Scarce Energy is 
Creating a New World Order (Oneworld, Oxford: 2008). Ricardo M. Soares de Oliviera, Oil and 
Politics in the Gulf of Guinea (C. Hurst & Co. London 2007).  
22 Robert I. Rotberg (ed.) Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa (World Peace Foundation, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, and the Brookings Institution, Washington DC: 2005). Alex De Waal (ed.) 
Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa (Indiana University Press, Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: 2004). David J. Francis, US Strategy in Africa: AFRICOM, terrorism, and security 
challenges (Routledge, London and New York: 2010). John David (ed.) Africa and the War on 
Terrorism (Ashgate, Aldershot and Burlington 2007).  
23 Deborah Brautigen, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa (Oxford University Press: 
Oxford and New York, 2009); Suisheng Zhao (ed.) China in Africa: Strategic Motives and Economic 
Interests (Routledge: London and New York 2015); Dambisa Moyo, Winner Take All: China’s Race 
for Resources and What It Means for Us (Penguin Books, London, 2012). 
24 See for example, Brooks and Wohlforth, America Abroad; Zbigniew Brzezinski, Strategic Vision: 
America and the Crisis of Global Power (Basic Books, New York 2012). 
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This article will offer a more holistic analysis and argue that a confluence of factors – 
energy security, transnational terrorism, and continental economic growth – has led to 
a fundamental shift in the way US policy makers view Sub-Saharan Africa in the 21st 
century and its place in US global strategy. The same realist sensibility that led US 
policymakers to discard Africa in any serious strategic sense at the end of the Cold 
War led, in the Bush and Obama years, to a renewed interest in and concern for the 
continent in security, geopolitical, and commercial terms that are comparable to the 
way in which US policymakers view other significant areas of the world. To be sure, 
Sub-Saharan Africa is far from being the most important region for the United States, 
but by the end of the Obama years, it was almost uniformly viewed by US 
policymakers as a region that could not be ignored or dismissed in global strategy 
formation.  As it attempts to integrate Sub-Saharan Africa into the global order, 
however, the United States has already begun to repeat mistakes made in other key 
regions of the world. If it continues to view Africa in geopolitical terms, the Trump 
administration will need to ensure that the US footprint there does not become a 
source of resentment that undermines US interests and security in the long term. 
 
A final caveat concerns the reductionism that can occur when policy makers divide 
the world, sometimes too superficially, into different regions. Grand strategy is “a 
reductionist discipline”, Brands argues, since those undertaking it tend to “impose a 
sense of order on a stubbornly complex international environment.”25 As Brendan 
Vickers points out, Africa is a continent of 54 countries, 1 billion people, and over 
3000 languages.26 References to ‘Africa’ – which almost always refer to Sub-Saharan 
                                                        
25 Brands, What Good Is Grand Strategy?: 10-11. 
26 Brendan Vickers, ‘Africa and the rising powers’ International Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 3, May 2013: 
674. 
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Africa – that occur in US policymaking can elide the diversity of the region, 
encourage the formation of policy that is insufficiently attuned to regional and 
national differences, and even overlook or deny the agency and preferences of local 
actors.27 (This is equally true for references to ‘Eurasia’, ‘Europe’ or ‘Latin 
America.’)  Sub-Saharan states are not passive actors accepting a fate foisted upon 
them by the United States. They often act independently on the regional and global 
stage; they have at times successfully ‘soft balanced’ the United States; they have also 
actively shaped and encouraged external interventions.28 This article takes a different 
but not mutually exclusive perspective and focuses instead on US perceptions of 
contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa and official opinion on how and why Washington 
should engage with it. Without endorsing the US approach, it remains important to 
understand how Washington views the world given the unprecedented reach and 
depth of American power and the international and transnational dimensions of its 
strategy. This article seeks to elucidate the drivers behind the US approach to Sub-
Saharan Africa in the 21st century and evaluate the consequences thus far of 
Washington’s approach.  
 
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA  
                                                        
27 A growing literature on ‘small states’ analyses the agency of less powerful countries. For some of the 
key interventions see Christine Ingebritsen, Iver B. Neumann, Sieglinde Gstöhl, and Jessica Beyer 
(eds.) Small States in International Relations (University of Washington Press/University of Iceland 
Press: Seattle and Reykjavik, 2006). On Africa see William Brown, ‘A question of agency: Africa in 
international politics’ Third World Quarterly, Vol. 33 (10), 2012: 1889-1908. 
28 Jonathan Fisher and David M. Anderson, ‘Authoritarianism and the securitization of development in 
Africa’ International Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 1, January 2015: 131-151. Alex Vines, ‘A decade of African 
peace and security architecture’ International Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 1, January 2013: 89-109. Maria 
Raquel Freire, Paula Duarte Lopes & Daniela Nascimento, ‘Responsibility to protect’ and the African 
Union: Assessing the AU’s capacity to respond to regional complex humanitarian and political 
emergencies’ African Security Review, Vol. 25, No. 3, 2016: 223-241; Thomas Kwasi Tieku, ‘African 
Union promotion of human security’ African Security Review, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2007: 26-37; Beth Elise 
Whitaker, ‘Soft balancing among weak states? Evidence form Africa’ International Affairs, Vol. 86, 
No. 5, September 2010: 1109-1127. 
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Africa was certainly not the first priority of the incoming George W. Bush 
administration in early 2001. When Bush ran for the Presidency, there was no sign 
that he would substantially alter existing US strategy towards the Sub-Saharan region. 
In the second Presidential debate, he expressed strong support for Clinton’s decision 
not to intervene more effectively in the 1994 Rwandan genocide.29 An important 
indication of Africa’s changing status came in May 2001, however, with the 
publication of the report of the National Energy Policy Development Group, led by 
Vice President Dick Cheney (also known as the Cheney Report).30 A key 
recommendation of the report was the diversification of foreign oil supplies away 
from the Middle East in order to minimize the impact of a supply disruption. The 
study recommended “that the President make energy security a priority of our trade 
and foreign policy” with a particular focus on West Africa and the Caspian Sea, both 
growth areas in terms of energy production.31 West Africa was destined to be 
one of our fastest-growing sources of oil and gas for the American market. 
African oil tends to be of high quality and low in sulphur making it suitable for 
stringent refined product requirements, and giving it a growing market share for 
refining centers on the East Coast of the United States.32  
Whereas the previous National Energy Strategy in 1998 did not even mention Africa, 
the new report called on the President to direct the Secretaries of State, Energy, and 
Commerce to reinvigorate the US-Africa Trade and Economic Co-operation Forum 
and the US-Africa Energy Ministerial process; to deepen bilateral and multilateral 
engagement to promote a more receptive environment for US oil and gas trade, 
                                                        
29 The Second Bush-Gore Presidential Debate, 11 October 2000, Debate Transcript, 
http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-11-2000-debate-transcript (29.11.12)  
30 National Energy Policy, Report of the National Energy Policy Development Group (henceforth 
NEPDG report), May 2001, http://www.ne.doe.gov/pdfFiles/nationalEnergyPolicy.pdf  (28.11.12). 
31 NEPDG report: ch. 8, p.3; p.4, and p.7. 
32 Ibid: ch. 8, p.11.  
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investment and operations in Africa; and to revive the Joint Economic Partnership 
Committee with Nigeria to improve the climate for US oil and gas trade, investment, 
and operations.33 The report led to a shift in the administration’s view of Sub-Saharan 
Africa: it identified vital material interests there that could serve the geopolitical 
imperative of diversifying America’s foreign energy sources. In April 2002, at his 
inaugural press briefing, the new Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African 
Affairs, Michael Westphal acknowledged that “Africa is not always a topic, which is 
high on the agenda list here in the Pentagon. But I’m here to tell you that it’s actually 
something, which does matter.” Westphal continued: 
To begin with, 15 percent of the U.S.’s imported oil supply comes from sub-
Saharan Africa. This is also a number which has the potential for increasing 
significantly in the next decade. Poverty, unemployment and lack of capital 
development exacerbate social and ethnic tensions and create havens for 
conflict, insecurity and terrorism.34  
Visiting Nigeria in July 2002, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Walter 
Kansteiner, announced that “African oil is of national strategic interest to us, and it 
will increase and become more important as we go forward.”35 Although the 
implementation of the Cheney report recommendations does not appear to have begun 
                                                        
33 Comprehensive National Energy Strategy, April 1998, 
http://prop1.org/thomas/peacefulenergy/cnesM.pdf (accessed 03.07.17). NEPDG report: ch. 8: 11-12. It 
seems likely that the recommendations of the NEPDG report were influenced by Cheney’s meetings 
with representatives of major oil companies. The archive of meeting papers is available at National 
Resources Defense Council, The Cheney Energy Task Force, http://nrdctools.org/pdfs/energy-task-
force/moreinfo.html It is also true, however, that President Bush had already appointed many former 
energy lobbyists to his administration. See Michael J. Lynch, Ronald G. Burns, Paul B. Stretesky, 
‘Global warming and state-corporate crime: the politicization of global warming under the Bush 
administration’ Crime, Law and Social Change, Vol. 54, July 2010: 219-21. 
 
34 Department of Defense News Briefing, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs 
(henceforth Westphal briefing), 2 April 2002, 
http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=3387 (17.07.17)  
35 Cited in ‘With Mideast uncertainty, US turns to Africa for oil’ Christian Science Monitor, 23 May 
2002, http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0523/p07s01-woaf.html (27.03.13).  
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in earnest until after 9/11, when Africa also took on renewed security importance, 
these policy initiatives are in line with the recommendations made in May 2001, 
though currently available evidence suggests that the preoccupation with Afghanistan 
at the top tier of policymaking left the articulation and implementation of the policy to 
assistant secretaries.  
 For the Department of Energy (DoE), the key objective of Bush’s national energy 
plan was to develop “a diverse set of energy resources from a diverse set of energy 
suppliers.” According to John Brodman, an assistant secretary at the DoE, “We have 
learned from experience that it is the marginal barrels that are the important factor in 
determining conditions in the oil market… Africa is important to us because it is an 
important source of the marginal barrels.”36 It was also home to “a number of frontier 
oil provinces that may become hot exploration areas during the coming decade” such 
as São Tomé and Principe, Gambia, Liberia, Togo, Benin and Niger.37 By 2003, West 
Africa was supplying the United States with approximately 12% of its imported oil, 
with significant production increases expected over the next decade, Brodman noted. 
However, an unfavourable business climate marked by corruption, political 
instability, border disputes, and poverty, was hampering foreign investment, which 
was essential for the development of West African oil, much of which was located 
offshore and in deep waters, making access especially costly. The investment climate, 
Brodman stated, “may keep needed energy resources locked away from development 
                                                        
36 Statement of John R. Brodman, Assistant Secretary for Political and International Affairs, 
Department of Energy, Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, ‘U.S. Energy Security: 
West Africa and Latin America’, 21 October 2003, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
108shrg91959/html/CHRG-108shrg91959.htm (06.07.17) 
37 Statement of John R. Brodman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Energy for International Energy 
Policy, Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, ‘The Gulf of Guinea and U.S. Strategic 
Energy Policy,’ 15 July 2004, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108shrg97231/html/CHRG-
108shrg97231.htm (06.07.17) 
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for a long time.” Addressing the challenges of the African investment climate “is one 
of the new challenges to our energy security aspirations”, Brodman declared.38  
The new focus on the African investment climate led to a series of diplomatic 
initiatives designed to improve the region’s investment environment and help 
“transnationalise” African oil – in other words, to bring it to the global market.39 At 
the G8 summit at Sea Island, Georgia, in 2004 Bush brought together G8 leaders and 
the heads of four African countries to announce wide ranging compacts to support 
transparency and good governance, with a particular focus on revenue flows in the 
energy sector. One of these was Nigeria – the “anchor of West Africa” which, alone, 
was supplying 10% of U.S. crude oil imports every day.40 The US Agency for 
International Development (USAID) was also providing technical assistance to the 
Nigerian Federal Budget Office, and funding an exchange programme on best 
practices among oil-affected communities in Angola, Nigeria, and São Tomé. The 
DoE was supporting World Bank and IMF efforts to help build capacity and provide 
technical assistance on governance, transparency and budgeting. In Angola, the US 
embassy and the DoE were supporting the development of a comprehensive domestic 
energy strategy.41 When Angolan President, José Eduardo dos Santos, visited the U.S. 
in May 2004, he pledged new levels of transparency in the energy sector including 
making public current payments from ChevronTexaco.42 In 2003, the US re-opened 
                                                        
38 Brodman 2003 testimony. For similar comments see also his 2004 testimony. See also comments on 
investment climate and oil exploitation by Paul Simons, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
Energy, Sanctions and Commodities, Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, ‘The Gulf of 
Guinea and U.S. Strategic Energy Policy’ 15 July 2004, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
108shrg97231/html/CHRG-108shrg97231.htm (06.07.17) 
39 Stokes and Raphael examine the US role in the transnationalization of oil globally in their Global 
Energy Security and American Hegemony: especially pp. 2-3. 
40 Summit Documents, ‘Fighting Corruption and Improving Transparency,’ Sea Island, 10 June 2004, 
http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2004seaisland/corruption.html Simons 2004 testimony. The White 
House, Sea Island Summit 2004, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/g8/2004/ (05.07.17) 
41 Simons 2004 testimony. 
42 ‘Angola Set to Disclose Payments from Big Oil’, New York Times, 13 May 2004. 
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its embassy in Equatorial Guinea, one of the “hot” “frontier oil provinces.” Finally, in 
cooperation with the UK, Norway and the Netherlands, the United States convened 
the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights process, bringing together oil 
and mining companies from the U.S. and Europe, with leading human rights NGOs 
and corporate social responsibility organizations. According to Paul Simons of the 
State Department, “improving transparency in the oil and gas sectors of the major 
African producers… is a win-win situation”: “countries with these attributes make 
better hosts to the very large investments needed to develop energy resources [and] 
make more reliable contributions to our own energy security.”43  
Until the mid-2000s, US military activity in Sub-Saharan Africa focused on the ‘war 
on terror’; by 2005, however, military activity in the oil-producing Gulf of Guinea 
had picked up significantly. In Abuja, Nigeria, in 2004, General Charles Wald – 
Deputy Commander of US European Command (EUCOM), which was then in charge 
of US military operations in Africa – said that he had discussed finding “a way that 
we can cooperate together in monitoring the waters off the Gulf of Guinea” with 
Nigerian officials including Deputy Defense Minister Roland Oritsejafor. 44 Assistant 
US Secretary of State for Africa, Charles Snyder, called for a West African coastal 
security programme on the grounds that “a lot of this new oil is actually off-shore. 
There is no one to protect it, unless we build up African coastal fleets.”45 By 2006, the 
US military presence in the Gulf had become “nearly continuous.” The US Navy was 
deployed to train over 750 security personnel from eight Gulf of Guinea countries in 
                                                        
43 Simons 2004 testimony. 
44 ‘U.S. general proposes help in ‘monitoring’ unstable West Africa oil gulf’ Associated Press, 12 July 
2004.   
45 Address by Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Charles Snyder at the American 
Enterprise Institute, Africa News, 18 April 2004.  
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boat maintenance and command and control organization.46 In 2007 the African 
coastal security programme envisioned by Wald and Snyder was finally established in 
the form of the US Navy’s Africa Partnership Station (APS), which remains the 
“flagship” programme of US Naval Forces Africa.47 Based in the Gulf of Guinea, the 
APS was an annual six-month sea-based deployment designed to enhance the capacity 
of littoral states to govern the Gulf region in the face of transnational crime, such as 
piracy, that might disrupt the flow of commerce.48  
It was not just in terms of energy that the Sub-Saharan region assumed a new 
importance.  The 9/11 attacks also catalysed a new threat-based security approach to 
the area. Now Africa was viewed as part of the “arc of instability” stretching from the 
Western hemisphere, through Africa and the Middle East and extending through Asia. 
According to the 2004 National Military Strategy 
There are areas in this arc that serve as breeding grounds for threats to our 
interests. Within these areas rogue states provide sanctuary to terrorists, 
protecting them from surveillance and attack. Other adversaries take 
advantage of ungoverned space and under-governed territories from which 
they prepare plans, train forces and launch attacks. These ungoverned areas 
often coincide with locations of illicit activities; such coincidence creates 
opportunities for hostile coalitions of criminal elements and ideological 
extremists.49 
 
After 9/11 the Sub-Sahara’s weak and failing states, its porous borders, and 
                                                        
46 Statement of General Bantz J. Craddock, before the House Armed Services Committee, 15 March 
2007, http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/TestCraddock070315.pdf : 22 (07.11.16)  
47 ‘Africa Partnership Station’, undated, http://www.africom.mil/what-we-do/security-
cooperation/africa-partnership-station (06.07.17) 
48 ‘Global Fleet Station Pilot One Step Closer with Arrival of Swift’, 9 April 2007, 
http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=28777 (15.05.13). Kathi A. Sohn, ‘The Global Fleet 
Station: A Powerful Tool for Preventing Conflict’ Naval War College Review, Winter 2009, Vol. 62, 
No. 1: 45-58. Naval Operations Concept 2006, 
http://www.quantico.usmc.mil/seabasing/docs/Naval_Operations_Concept_2006.pdf: 30-31(15.05.13)  
49 Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2004, 
http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nms/nms2004.pdf?ver=2014-06-25-123447-627: 5.  
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“ungoverned spaces” were viewed through the lens of transnational terrorism.50 
Colonel Victor Nelson, who would directly manage the first counterterrorism 
programme in Africa, summed up US concerns: “We have said for a long time that if 
you squeeze terrorists in Afghanistan, Pakistan Iraq and other places, they will find 
new places to operate and one of those is the Sahel-Maghreb.”51  Weak states in 
Africa were now seen as potential breeding grounds for terrorism. According to 
General James L. Jones, Commander of EUCOM, it was the “large uncontrolled, 
ungoverned areas” of the continent, which might offer sanctuary to terrorists that 
concerned the Bush administration most.52 Thus the US objective after 9/11 was to 
prevent terrorist groups from taking root by securing borders and building the security 
and governance capacity of weak and failing states.53  
To this end, the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) was 
established in 2002 with its headquarters in Djibouti, where it remains at the time of 
writing, as Washington’s only Main Operating Base in Africa.54 The Task Force 
                                                        
50 Statement of General James L. Jones, USMC, Commander of the United States European Command, 
Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 28 September 2005, 
http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2005/JonesTestimony050928.pdf (30.11.09): 9. See also comments 
made during an interview in, ‘Transforming EUCOM’, Stars and Stripes, 15 June 2003.  
51 Jim Fisher-Thompson, ‘US-African Partnership Helps Counter Terrorists in Sahel Region’, 24 
March 2004, reproduced by the State Department’s Bureau of International Information Programs at 
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52 Jones cited in Eric Schmitt, ‘Pentagon Seeking New Access Pacts for Africa Bases’, New York 
Times, 5 July 2003.  
53 For an overview see Robert G. Berschinski, AFRICOM’s Dilemma: The ‘Global War on Terrorism’, 
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analysis of the concept of ‘failed states’ see Charles T. Call, ‘The Fallacy of the Failed State’ Third 
World Quarterly, Vol. 29 (8), 2008: 1491-1507; Sonja Grimm, ‘“Fragile States”: introducing a political 
concept’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 35 (2), 2014: 197-209. 
54 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the 
Republic of Djibouti on Access to and Use of Facilities in the Republic of Djibouti, 19 February 2003, 
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/191488.pdf (05.07.17). CJTF-HOA Factsheet, 
http://www.hoa.africom.mil/pdfFiles/Fact%20Sheet.pdf (11.12.12) ‘Main Operating Bases’ (MOBs) 
are the largest type of US overseas military base. See Department of Defense, Strengthening U.S. 
Global Defense Posture, September 2004, Report to Congress, http://www.dmzhawaii.org/wp-
content/uploads/2008/12/global_posture.pdf: 10 (13.07.17)  
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included Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea, the Seychelles, and the host 
nation, Djibouti, as well as an expansive ‘area of comprised of Yemen, Tanzania, 
Mauritius, Madagascar, interest’ Mozambique, Burundi, Rwanda, the Comoros, Chad, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Uganda.55 According to its Commander, 
Major General John F. Sattler, “the porous borders with Somalia” were a key concern, 
but the mission as a whole was “very broad, in that we [are] to track transnational 
terrorism across the Horn of Africa, going from Yemen across the Gulf of Aden, and 
then, you know, the entire Horn.”56 By 2011, between 2,000 and 2,500 short term 
rotational US military personnel were stationed with the Task Force at any one time.57  
 
In 2002, the State Department launched the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI), a train-and-
equip programme “to assist Mali, Niger, Chad, and Mauritania in detecting and 
responding to suspicious movement of people and goods across and within their 
borders through training, equipment and co-operation.”58 Its counterpart, the East 
Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI), was launched in 2003, dedicated to 
improving counterterrorist capabilities of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Eritrea, and 
Ethiopia.59 Fuelled by the perception of success, the Pan Sahel Initiative was 
expanded into the larger Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI) in early 
                                                        
55 See the web site of the CJTF-HOA at http://www.hoa.africom.mil/# (11.12.12) Copy in author’s 
possession. 
56 News Briefing, Major General John F. Sattler, Commander, Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of 
Africa, 10 January 2003, http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=1246 
(08.08.16) 
57 Congressional Research Service, Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. 
Military in Africa by Lauren Ploch, 22 July 2011, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34003.pdf: 21.  
58 ‘Pan Sahel Initiative’, press release, Office of Counterterrorism, Washington DC, November 7, 2002, 
http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/14987.htm (05.02.13).  
59 Karl Wycoff, Associate Coordinator for Press, Policy, Programs and Plans, Office of the Coordinator 
for Counterterrorism, Department of State, Prepared Statement before the House Committee on 
Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, 
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa92870.000/hfa92870_0.HTM: 22 (11.02.13) 
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2005.60 This included nine countries in total: the original PSI four and an additional 
five: Nigeria, Senegal, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. The TSCTI was a broader, 
more holistic approach to security that was designed “to address socio-economic 
conditions and weak state control over outlying regions of the Sahel that are 
facilitating the entry of Islamic extremists from outside and the recruitment of 
disaffected youth.”61 These programmes demonstrated the securitization and 
militarization of the US approach to Africa compared to the relatively non-
interventionist stance and humanitarian framework of the Clinton years.   
 
In the Horn of Africa, however, the preventive security approach taken by the United 
States did not preclude the emergence of militant Islamist groups. So concerned was 
the Bush administration about the actual presence of alleged militants in East Africa, 
that Washington resorted to hard power, fighting a proxy war, via Ethiopia, against 
the Islamic Courts in Somalia from 2006-07 – a kind of US intervention not seen in 
Africa since the Cold War.62 For the pro-American Ethiopian leader, Meles Zenawi, 
the main concern was the Islamic Courts’ alliance with two anti-Ethiopian armed 
groups – the Oromo Liberation Front, and the Ogaden National Liberation Front.63 
                                                        
60 State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2005, Chapter 5 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65468.pdf: 46 (14.02.13). ‘New Counterterrorism 
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However, the State Department was more worried about the alleged presence of Al 
Qaeda-linked militants in Somalia.64 The result was a green light from Washington 
for the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in late 2006 and the provision of US support. 
Although there is currently only an incomplete picture of the US assistance to 
Ethiopia, it is clear from State Department cables that the Meles government 
welcomed the “terrific” military and intelligence support from Washington, including 
drones and Special Operations Forces assistance.65 At the end of January 2007, 
Ambassador Donald Yamamoto reported from the US embassy in Addis Ababa that 
“Cooperation remains strong, and our intelligence-sharing relationship is robust.”66 
The proxy war was a further indication of the new security calculus that governed 
Washington’s approach to Africa in the 21st century.  Its support for Meles, and 
opposition to the Islamic Courts would continue into the Obama years.  
 
Nevertheless, the US approach to Sub-Saharan Africa during Bush’s Presidency was 
not entirely devoid of humanitarian content. The President’s Emergency Plan For 
Aids Relief (PEPFAR), announced in January 2003, pledged $15 billion over five 
years towards anti-retroviral drugs and educational efforts to combat the spread of 
AIDS. Aimed at fourteen countries in Africa and the Caribbean, PEPFAR was the 
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largest global health initiative by any nation to combat a single disease. When the 
programme was announced, an estimated 50,000 people in sub-Saharan Africa were 
receiving treatment for HIV/AIDS. By 2008, this had increased dramatically to more 
than two million.67 Yet PEPFAR was not conceived as part of a holistic new geo-
strategic approach to Africa, but developed along a quite separate policy track in 
response to demands from the politically important evangelical Christian community 
in the United States, which sought avenues for the expression of a ‘compassion-
based’ foreign policy, inspired and justified by a biblical obligation to help the 
suffering. Bush’s own public justifications were based on religious obligation rather 
than strategic or Africa-specific objectives. Announcing PEPFAR to Congress in 
2003, he described it as “a work of mercy” and called for the country to “lead the 
world in sparing innocent people from a plague of nature.”  U.S. national strategy 
documents also presented the issue in humanitarian not security terms.68 The 
programme was not just directed at Africa, but at eleven countries in the Caribbean 
too because the criteria for inclusion was not specifically geographical but based on 
the “size and demographics of the population with HIV/AIDS… the needs of that 
population and the existing infrastructure or funding levels.”69 In other words, the 
programme often most associated with Africa during the Bush years was not an 
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outgrowth of the new geopolitical vision of the continent and its integration into the 
neoliberal order, but derived purely from domestic political considerations. 
 
The new geopolitical focus on Africa culminated in the establishment of the 
Pentagon’s first ever Unified Combatant Command structure for the continent in 
2007, Africa Command (AFRICOM), which assumed control from EUCOM of all 
existing US military activity in Africa, and facilitated more coherent military planning 
on a continental scale. Reflecting the new official view of Africa as a site of both 
geopolitical interest and security concerns, AFRICOM was designed to defend the 
full spectrum of US interests on the continent from energy security to protecting and 
stabilising ‘ungoverned space’. The Command was not welcomed by African nations, 
however. The US failure to consult African countries in advance of the Command’s 
establishment in 2007 resulted in distrust and suspicion of AFRICOM. No country 
would agree to host its headquarters, which in 2017 was still located in Stuttgart, 
Germany.70 
 
Some scholars have assumed that the militarization of the US presence in Africa, 
symbolised by the establishment of AFRICOM, is directed in part at China.71  
Since the early 2000s, the Chinese government has attempted to secure oil, gas, and 
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other natural resources from across Africa.72 In fact, China’s use of oil had increased 
at an exponential rate: between 1995 and 2005, its oil consumption doubled to 
6.8million bpd. In 2003, it surpassed Japan to become the world’s second largest oil 
consumer where it has remained since.73 By 2006, China was Africa’s third most 
important trading partner and nine of its top ten trading partners were oil-producing 
states.74 However, as Dambisa Moyo explains, Beijing’s efforts were not dedicated to 
“transnationalising” those resources – bringing them to the international market, as 
the US sought to do – but towards securing exclusive supply agreements.75 This has 
been interpreted, quite logically, by some scholars as evidence of a clash between the 
US and China over Africa’s oil.76 Based on the currently available evidence, however, 
this assumption may be slightly overstated. Official US strategy and planning 
documents rarely, if ever, state explicitly that US efforts are directed against 
Beijing.77 Instead, the expressed objective is to integrate all rising powers into the 
existing global system, creating a positive-sum dynamic, thereby deterring potential 
challenges to the system. As the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review stated, “The 
United States will work to ensure that all major and emerging powers are integrated 
as constructive actors and stakeholders into the international system.”78 Describing 
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US policy objectives in Africa, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Theresa Whelan, 
claimed that Washington was committed to ensuring “free market access” to African 
oil for all countries. Energy from the Gulf of Guinea was not just important to the 
United States, Whelan claimed; it was “strategically important to the world. If African 
oil were to fall off the oil market, it wouldn’t simply be the United States that would 
see its oil prices go through the roof.”79 While prima facie evidence may exist for a 
US-China clash over African oil, there is no clear documentary evidence as yet that 
US policymakers believe that China, despite its behavior, cannot be integrated into 
the US-led international system and satisfy its energy demands through the open 
market, though it is possible such evidence may emerge in the future. The US attitude 
may also be explained by the fact that China’s strategy in Africa remains largely 
economic and political rather than military. An increase in the number of Chinese 
trade officials posted to embassies in Africa was not matched by an increase in 
military ties, and there is only one Chinese military base in Africa.80 In other words, 
China’s ambitions there appear, at present at least, to be more limited than 
Washington’s. 
 
CONTINUITY UNDER OBAMA 
Security 
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With Barack Obama’s paternal Kenyan heritage, expectations for his Presidency were 
high in his ancestral homeland, where ‘Obamamania’ preceded his 2008 election 
victory.81 However, Obama’s heritage appeared to have little impact on the substance 
of his Africa policy, which hewed closely to the trajectory established by Bush. In 
2012, the Obama administration released a Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa. This 
document could hardly have differed more from the previous version released back in 
the Clinton years, quoted at the outset, that had virtually disavowed any commercial 
or strategic interest in Africa. The 2012 strategy stated that Africa was “more 
important than ever to the security and prosperity… [of] the United States.”82  The 
continent was home to a number of transnational security challenges such as al Qaeda 
and other terrorist groups, which required the continuation of US efforts to 
“strengthen the capacity of civilian bodies to provide security for their citizens and 
counter violent extremism through more effective governance, development, and law 
enforcement efforts” as well as building the security capacity of African militaries.83 
Under Obama, existing Bush-era counterterrorism programmes in Africa were 
extended. According to Daniel Benjamin of the Office of the Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism, the State Department remained concerned about the “porous 
borders” and “limited resources” of African states.84 The Trans-Sahara 
Counterterrorism Initiative continued with the same rationale as in the Bush years: 
building the capacity of local security forces to counter terrorism and control 
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territory.85 AFRICOM continued to oversee the work of the Combined Joint Task 
Force – Horn of Africa in Djibouti.86 Moreover, the Obama administration 
supplemented these existing programmes with new activities cut from the same cloth. 
The State Department’s $100m Partnership for Regional East African 
Counterterrorism (PREACT) was another “multifaceted, multiyear strateg[y] to 
combat violent extremism and defeat terrorist organizations” through “build[ing] the 
capacity and cooperation of military, law enforcement, and civilian actors” in 
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, and Uganda.”87 In 2014, at Obama’s 
request, Congress created a new $5 billion Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund also 
dedicated to counter-terrorism capacity building.88 2017 Partnership Fund monies 
were earmarked for use in East Africa, the Sahel-Maghreb, and in the ‘Lake Chad 
Basin’ to counter Boko Haram in Nigeria.89 A third new – though subtly different – 
capacity building programme was announced by Obama in August 2014: the Security 
Governance Initiative (SGI), between the United States and six African partners – 
Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Tunisia – was dedicated to building the 
capacity of institutions that focused on addressing transnational challenges including 
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terrorism and piracy.90 As such the Obama team accepted the Bush administration’s 
analysis of Africa as a potential and actual locus of terrorism, as well as its emphasis 
on capacity-building in the security sector as an antidote to this. 
 
Under Obama, anti-piracy activities were also stepped up in both the Gulf of Guinea 
and the Horn of Africa. In fact the militarization of the US approach to the Gulf – 
driven by concern for the security of the region’s natural resources – intensified most 
as US oil imports from the region were falling dramatically. In 2010, 17.25% of all 
US imported oil came from the Gulf of Guinea; in 2014 it was just 2.98%.91 This 
dramatic downward trajectory was the opposite of what the State Department, the 
Department of Energy, and the US Intelligence Community had been predicting in the 
early 21st century.92 It was the result of a major unforeseen increase in US domestic 
oil and gas production from shale rock formations, which displaced oil imported from 
the Gulf of Guinea.93 Yet, significantly, the fact that the United States itself was less 
reliant on West African oil did not lessen its commitment to securing that area and 
ensuring that its oil reached the global market – exemplifying and affirming the 
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importance of providing global public goods, in this case energy, for others in US 
grand strategy in the 21st century. At the Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Dialogue 
seminar held in September 2014, Secretary of the Navy, Ray Mabus, spoke of the 
economic importance of securing the seas: “the global economy depends on safe 
access to and through the world’s oceans” Mabus said; “From manufactured goods, 
oil, cocoa beans, iron ore… shipping is vital to your economies” [sic.].94 The 
Commander of US Naval Forces in Africa, Admiral Mark Ferguson, stated that the 
Gulf of Guinea “is important not only for Africa, but for the global economy… West 
African nations that border the gulf possess a wealth of natural resources and human 
capital which, if managed prudently, could make the region a powerful force for 
African growth and development, and a significant influence in global affairs.”95  
 
More specifically, in response to a spike in oil piracy in 2011, the United States 
intensified its military commitment to the Gulf of Guinea by initiating an annual 
multinational training exercise, Operation Obangame Express, designed to train 
partners in this vital region in maritime security. In 2016, Obangame Express 
included thirty-two countries from the Gulf littoral states and European nations 
including the UK, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, and the Netherlands.96 In 
addition to training exercises, the United States also organized real interdictions on 
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the high seas under the auspices of the African Maritime Law Enforcement 
Partnership, an operational phase of the US Africa Partnership Station, the Navy’s 
offshore Gulf of Guinea base.97 The Partnership, led by the Navy and AFRICOM, 
was designed to allow “African partner nations to build maritime security capacity 
and improve management of their maritime environment through real world 
combined law enforcement operations.”98 Since the establishment of the Africa 
Partnership Station in 2006, the US Navy has trained thousands of military personnel 
in skills such as seamanship, search and rescue operations, law enforcement, medical 
readiness, and boat maintenance.99 Thus far, however, local capacity remains 
insufficient and underdeveloped. By 2015, the Gulf of Guinea had become the most 
dangerous region in the world for seafarers with a rise in violence across the year and 
an increase in kidnap-for-ransom in the fourth quarter of 2015.100 As unsuccessful as 
these US-led efforts were, however, Washington’s attempt to secure the region and 
bring its oil to the international market had intensified despite the fact that US imports 
from the Gulf of Guinea had dropped dramatically, demonstrating the importance to 
US global strategy of ensuring the provision of adequate energy supplies on the global 
market.101 
 
Much more successful than the US-led security efforts in the Gulf of Guinea has been 
the major multilateral and institutional anti-piracy effort in the Horn of Africa. In 
                                                        
97 ‘Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea.’ ‘African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership 
Underway’ 4 February 2016, http://www.africom.mil/NewsByCategory/article/27940/african-
maritime-law-enforcement-partnership-underway  
98 In February 2016, for instance, a combined operation took place between the Ghanaian Navy, the US 
Navy, and the US Coast Guard to patrol Ghana’s exclusive economic zone and detect any illegal 
maritime activity. See ‘African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership Underway.’  
99 Ibid. 
100 The State of Maritime Piracy 2015: Piracy and Robbery Against Ships in the Gulf of Guinea 2015, 
Oceans Beyond Piracy, http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/reports/sop2015/west-africa (16.10.16) 
101 On grand strategy, capitalism, and commodities, see note 2. 
 31 
December 2008, the US tabled a United Nations resolution calling for international 
action to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia. This resulted in the establishment of 
the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) supported by nearly 
eighty countries, and international organizations including the African Union, the 
Arab League, the European Union, the International Maritime Organization, and 
various departments and agencies of the United Nations. The Contact Group’s work 
focuses on capacity building, led by the UK; strengthening judicial mechanisms for 
deterring piracy, led by Portugal; counter-piracy operations led by the United Arab 
Emirates; and disrupting piracy networks ashore, led by Italy.102 The Obama 
administration also supported the so-called New York Declaration: a commitment to 
best management practices to avoid, deter, or delay acts of piracy, signed alongside 
Cyprus, Japan, Singapore, the UK, the Bahamas, Liberia, Panama, and the Marshall 
Islands.103 These efforts, alongside additional counter-piracy activities by the EU and 
Nato, led to a dramatic reduction in the number of piracy incidents.104 The economic 
cost of piracy off the Somali coast fell from $7B in 2010 to $1.3B in 2015.105 This 
major international coalition against piracy, supported by the Obama administration, 
has been the most successful element of the United States’ security strategy in Africa 
in the 21st century. 
 
 Economic Opportunity in Africa 
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As well as maintaining the Bush administration’s emphasis on Africa as a site of 
security challenges and natural resources, sub-Saharan Africa was identified by the 
Obama administration as a major site of new economic opportunity.106 In April 2012, 
the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative, Florizelle Liser, testified to the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs about the importance of an area of the world where 
“returns on investment… rarely dip below 10%, representing one of the highest rates 
of return in the world.” This location offered “a wide range of… opportunities for 
U.S. businesses” because it contained “many of the fastest growing economies in the 
world with rapidly growing middle class consumers” who were “increasingly 
demanding high quality U.S. products.”107 One manifestation of this was the 
Increasing American Jobs Though Greater Exports to Africa Act of 2012. As the co-
author of the House bill, Rep. Bobby Rush (D-ILL), stated in Congressional hearings 
that, “Seven out of ten of the fastest growing economies are today in Africa. Africa 
has an expanding middle class hungry for American products and its services. It is 
also in need of investment in its rapidly expanding infrastructure.”108 In his supporting 
testimony, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Johnnie Carson, offered his “firm 
belief that Africa represents the next global economic frontier” because its growth 
projections were higher than predictions for Latin America, Central Asia, and Europe. 
The State Department’s initiatives to support US investment in Africa included a 
recent trade mission to Mozambique, Tanzania, Nigeria, and Ghana with ten US 
energy companies, and the hosting of the US-Africa Business Conference in Ohio in 
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June 2012.109 (Although Carson did not mention the sizeable Chinese commercial 
presence in Africa, it did concern members of Congress. Bobby Rush warned that “we 
are standing flat-footed as China, India, and Brazil and others are being fleet-footed.” 
Other Congressional hearings were also convened to discuss China’s role in 
Africa.110)  
 
Commercial opportunities in Africa were also at the heart of the 2014 US-Africa 
Leaders Summit. The first event of its kind, the three-day summit brought almost fifty 
African leaders to Washington, and was intended as “a very clear signal that we are 
elevating our engagement with Africa” because – according to Deputy National 
Security Advisor, Ben Rhodes – “we see enormous opportunities in Africa.”111 The 
summit saw the launch of the Doing Business in Africa Campaign (DBIA). With a 
5.4% growth rate predicted for 2014, Africa was outpacing global growth, while US 
goods and services exports to Africa had increased 40% since 2009, supporting 
250,000 US jobs.112 At the US-Africa summit, an array of new commitments was 
made by departments and agencies across the US government dedicated to deepening 
US commercial engagement in Africa. The President announced $7 billion in new 
financing to promote US exports and investments. US companies announced new 
deals in clean energy, aviation, banking, and construction worth more than $14 
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billion. An additional $12 billion was committed as part of Obama’s public-private 
Power Africa initiative designed to bring 60 million new electricity connections to 
sub-Saharan Africa.113 Further new commitments to investments in and exports to 
Africa were made by the Departments of Agriculture, State, Commerce, 
Transportation, Energy, and the US Agency for International Development.114 There 
was also bipartisan agreement on the new approach to Africa. According to Rhodes, 
“Congress has played an enormous role on a bipartisan basis in supporting Africa 
policy. It is important to note that in an environment in Washington where there’s not 
a lot of bipartisan agreement, Africa has been a true exception.”115 
 
CONSEQUENCES: 2009 - 2017 
In the Sub-Saharan region, as in the Middle East, the counterterrorism activities 
pursued by the United States for more than a decade have so far failed to stabilise the 
region or prevent the emergence of new Islamist terrorist groups. When Ethiopian 
combat troops withdrew from Somalia after driving the Islamic Courts out of 
Mogadishu in 2009, they were replaced by US-backed peacekeepers from Uganda, 
Burundi, and Ethiopia under the auspices of the African Union Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM).116 The presence of the Ethiopians – Somalia’s long-standing adversary, 
which had just waged war on the country – severely undermined the credibility of the 
peacekeepers, which were widely viewed as occupation forces. The government 
supported by the peacekeepers earned the derogatory epithet daba dhilifi 
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(‘government set up for a foreign purpose’ or ‘satellite government’) because of its 
Ethiopian and US backing.117 The leading resistance movement was an increasingly 
extremist Islamist-nationalist group called Al Shabaab, formerly a faction of the 
Islamic Courts, which grew in Somalia largely as a result of its opposition to the 
peacekeeping force. As Jeffrey Lefebvre observes, the Ethiopian occupation “allowed 
Islamic extremists like Al Shabaab to present their struggle as a war of national 
liberation and inadvertently fed ‘the monster’ – Islamic extremism – that the United 
States had set out to destroy.”118 In 2008 Al Shabaab evolved from a local Islamist 
nationalist group into an Al Qaeda franchise that began using suicide bombings, took 
over parts of central and southern Somalia, and portrayed its war against the 
transitional government as one front in the global jihadist struggle.119  In July 2010 it 
conducted its first attack outside the country in Kampala, Uganda. Though Obama 
was determined to avoid overt US involvement in Somalia he continued its covert 
activities, in particular the drone warfare campaign, as well as US support for 
Ethiopia and AMISOM. A 2010 Senate report on Al Qaeda in Somalia and Yemen 
confirmed that the United States had used air strikes to target suspected members of 
Al Qaeda in Somalia.120 Drone warfare in Somalia intensified through Obama’s 
second term as the administration demonstrated that it was every bit as willing as its 
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predecessor to use coercive military power in Africa to further US security 
objectives.121 In his final months in office, Obama further intensified the use of 
Special Operations Forces in Somalia and relaxed the rules on drone strikes to include 
bombing raids to protect African troops fighting against Al Shabaab – i.e. attacks 
when American lives were not at risk.122 
 
This approach failed to contain Al Shabaab, however. In early 2012, the group 
officially merged with Al Qaeda, and in September 2013 it carried out another 
international attack, this time in a shopping mall in Nairobi killing 67. Al Shabaab 
now controlled much of southern Somalia and waged an insurgency against the new 
government in Mogadishu.123 Despite the intensification of US drone strikes and SOF 
activity, the number of attacks by Al Shabaab increased dramatically from 26 in 2008, 
to 233 in 2012, and a high of 866 in 2014. In Obama’s final year in office this fell but 
only to 558.124 Both Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab were complex entities with multiple 
factions and franchises, but US actions seemed to have fanned the flames of conflict. 
As the report by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations concluded, “Al Qaeda is 
now a more sophisticated and dangerous organization in Africa… [It]s foothold in 
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Somalia has probably been facilitated by the involvement of Western powers and 
their allies.” In fact it was likely that US air strikes in Somalia “have only increased 
popular support for Al Shabaab” – striking criticism from a committee led by 
Senators from the President’s own party.125  
 
Nor have the capacity building security assistance programmes pursued by Obama 
and his predecessor enjoyed much success thus far. As noted above, the Gulf of 
Guinea became the most dangerous region in the world for seafarers despite US 
maritime security assistance. Mainland capacity building activities failed to prevent 
the emergence of an Al Qaeda franchise in North and West Africa – Al Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) – and failed to contain its activities in Mali, where it took 
control of the northern half of the country in 2012.126 Since its merger with Al Qaeda 
in 2006, AQIM has conducted frequent bomb attacks in Algeria and occasionally 
beyond.127 By 2012, there were signs that it was sharing explosives and funds with 
Nigeria’s Boko Haram.128  In 2003, Mali had been described as the “centerpiece and 
linchpin” of the Pan Sahel Initiative by the State Department.129 Yet after almost ten 
years of capacity building, the country was unable to prevent the emergence of AQIM 
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or contain its influence. One US Army Major, who spent nearly a year in the field 
with Malian forces, described the “highly visible disintegration of the Malian military 
in the face of al Qaeda affiliates and the coup d’etat by Malian junior military officers 
that led to the overthrow of the democratically elected president.”130 Although a 
French-led intervention stabilized the country by mid-2013, terrorism endured. In 
2009, AQIM was responsible for 33 acts of violence in the Sahel (though 24 of these 
were in Algeria). In 2016, it conducted 29 violent acts but now the majority (20) were 
in Mali. The group’s geographic reach expanded too. In 2016 it also conducted 
attacks in Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Algeria, Niger, and Mauritania.131 In March 
2015, General David Rodriguez, AFRICOM Commander, warned of “an increasingly 
cohesive network of al-Qa’ida affiliates and adherents” in Sub-Saharan Africa that 
“continues to exploit Africa’s under-governed regions and porous borders to train and 
conduct attacks.”132  
  
CONCLUSION  
Time will facilitate further judgements on the development and impact of these 
relatively recent events in the history of American foreign relations; yet some 
tentative conclusions can be drawn. By the end of the Obama era, Sub-Saharan Africa 
was viewed on a bipartisan basis as a location in which the full complement of 
security, material, and commercial interests should be weighed and pursued by US 
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=line&chart=overtime&ob=GTDID&od=desc#results-table (22.11.17) 
132 Statement of General David M. Rodriguez, Commander, United States Africa Command, Before the 
Senate Armed Services Committee, 26 March 2015, http://www.armed-
services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Rodriguez_03-26-15.pdf: 3, 6 (17.07.17)  
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officials, as they were during the Cold War years – though, to be sure, different policy 
prescriptions marked these two periods. From this vantage point, US engagement with 
Sub-Saharan Africa on the basis of hard interests appears to be the recent historical 
norm, interrupted only by a one-decade interregnum from the early-1990s to the early 
2000s. The renewed US interest in Africa since the turn of the millennium was not 
due to a radical change in worldview or mind-set; it was essentially realist 
considerations that led the Bill Clinton administration to de-emphasise Sub-Saharan 
Africa in US global strategy. Since 2001, however, policymakers from both parties 
have increasingly identified important US interests there – oil, counterterrorism, and 
more recently commercial opportunities – leading to a reappraisal of how the region 
fits into a 21st century US grand strategy that is inherently international and 
transnational in scope. While Africa is not fundamental to US hegemony in the way 
that the Middle East is, during the Bush and Obama years it was increasingly 
considered in geopolitical and commercial terms in the way that other regions of the 
world, such as Latin America and Southeast Asia, have been continuously since the 
Cold War.  
 
The implementation of many of the US initiatives described here – such as security 
assistance and capacity building programmes – was only possible with the consent of 
the African governments involved, which no doubt had their own reasons for working 
with the United States, although AFRICOM was the obvious exception.133 For the 
U.S, these alliances were essential because U.S. global strategy in the 21st century is 
                                                        
133 What motivated these governments to co-operate with the United States is a subject that requires 
further research. Preliminary discussions include: Nikolas Emmanuel, ‘African peacekeepers in Africa’ 
African Security Review, Vol. 24, No.1, January 2015: 23-38; and Brian J. Hesse, ‘Why Deploy to 
Somalia? Understanding Six Countries Reasons for Sending Soldiers to One of the World’s Most 
Failed States’ Journal of the Middle East and Africa, Vol. 6, No. 3-4, 2015: 329-352.   
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inherently international and transnational: it seeks to uphold and extend a world order 
from which other countries may derive benefits, and also to counter security 
challenges such as terrorism and piracy, which transcend state borders. The latter two 
necessitated multilateral and bilateral responses because targets may be located in 
multiple jurisdictions. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the result was a constellation of 
bilateral and multilateral alliances with the United States at the centre.134 While these 
partnerships were consensual, their activities were nevertheless shaped predominantly 
by US conceptions of what ails Africa. The narrative of the ‘war on terror’ and the 
related assumptions about weak states as potential incubators of terrorism, were 
conceived in Washington and transposed onto the Sahel, the Maghreb, and the Horn 
of Africa with minimal input from local actors, despite their willingness to co-operate. 
 
The fact that there was some degree of consent to the US approach should not divert 
us from the problems associated with it. As the United States integrates Sub-Saharan 
Africa into its global strategy, it has already begun to repeat mistakes made in other 
regions of the world, especially with regard to military intervention. Support for 
Ethiopia against the Islamic Courts contributed to the evolution of Al Shabaab into a 
deadly transnational terrorist network and Al Qaeda franchise. The US-led capacity 
building approach that has been at the heart of counterterrorism efforts in Sub-
Saharan Africa failed in Mali, while Boko Haram has expanded the scope and reach 
of its activities in Nigeria – a participant in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism 
Initiative since 2005.135 Nor has the US-led anti-piracy effort designed to secure the 
                                                        
134 On the Bush administration’s strategic rejection of unilateralism more broadly, see Maria Ryan, 
‘Bush the transnationalist: a reappraisal of the unilateralist impulse in US foreign policy, 2001–2009’, 
International Affairs, 54 (5): 561-582. 
135 Country Reports on Terrorism 2015, Chapter 2, Africa Overview, ‘Nigeria’, 
https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257514.htm (22.12.17). 
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Gulf of Guinea enjoyed much, if any, success. That military intervention is not always 
welcomed by those on the receiving end and does not always achieve its objectives is 
hardly a new lesson for policy-makers but nevertheless it has been demonstrated 
again as the US renews its engagement with Sub-Saharan Africa in the 21st century.  
 
Thus far, most of these US-led initiatives have eschewed established multilateral 
institutions, though as noted above the U.S. has not acted alone.  Moreover, since the 
Islamic Courts did not in fact invade Ethiopia in 2006, US support for Addis Ababa’s 
invasion of Somalia was moot under international law. US-led efforts that have 
bypassed multilateral organisations and, in at least one case, ignored international law 
have been relatively unsuccessful. In contrast, the only security programme so far to 
achieve substantive and measurable success in this period of renewed US engagement 
with Africa has been the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia – the 
major multilateral anti-piracy programme run by recognised international institutions 
rather than by the United States. Thus far, only a major international coalition has 
been willing and able to supply the resources required to cope with the scale of a 
transnational security problem like piracy. However, it seems unlikely that this 
approach will be expanded. Given that the ultimate purpose of U.S. grand strategy in 
the early 21st century has been national primacy, and since the approach to Sub-
Saharan Africa has been bipartisan, a radical change in Washington’s approach seems 
unlikely. 
 
 
 
